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Project Synopsis
Income inequality has, over the last 4 decades, increased dramatically in the United
States and Canada [1–5]. It is a concerning trend. Not only is inequality objection-
able ethically, it also seems to be corrosive to human welfare. As inequality grows,
human well-being worsens [6–8]. But while the extent and effects of inequality
are well-studied, the cause(s) of growing inequality remains poorly understood.
My research attempts to address this deficiency.
I propose that hierarchy — the rank ordering of individuals within a chain of
command — is central to how humans distribute resources [9]. The idea is that
individuals within a hierarchy tend to use their power to accumulate resources.
The result is that income tends to grow with hierarchical rank.
I have assembled a variety of evidence that confirms (at static points in time)
this hierarchy-income hypothesis [10–13]. My post-doctoral research will attempt
to extend the evidence to understand how hierarchy relates to the growth of in-
equality. I propose that the recent growth of top incomes (in the United States and
Canada) has been caused by a hierarchical redistribution of income. The idea is
that income has been taken from those at the bottom of the corporate hierarchy
and given to those at the top.
To investigate this hypothesis, I will extend a large-scale numerical model de-
veloped during my PhD studies [14]. This model is the first (to my knowledge) to
rigorously connect the distribution of income at the macro-level to the fine-scale,
hierarchical structure of firms. I have previously found that this model accurately
predicts key features of the US distribution of income [11,13]. In my post-doctoral
research, I will extend the model to study income redistribution — changes in in-
come distribution over time.
By studying how growing income inequality (in the US and Canada) relates to




The goal of my post-doctoral research is to investigate how income redistribution
relates to the hierarchical structure of firms. This research is driven by the follow-
ing research question and specific aims:
• Research Question: How does the recent growth of macro-level income
inequality (in the United States and Canada) relate to the fine-scale, hierar-
chical structure of firms?
• Aim 1: Extend a large-scale computational model (developed during my
PhD) to simulate how the redistribution of income relates to the hierarchical
structure of US and Canadian firms. (Months: 0–4)
• Aim 2: Test this model against the available empirical evidence in the United
States and Canada. (Months: 5–8)
• Aim 3: Use the model to infer if/how a hierarchical redistribution of income
has driven the growth of inequality. (Months: 9–12)
• Aim 4: Use the model (in tandem with empirical evidence) to study potential
policy for reducing inequality. (Months: 13–24. This is proposed research
for a second year of postdoctoral study, if the position is renewed.)
Research Background
“Man is born free,” Jean-Jacques Rousseau famously proclaimed, and yet “he is
everywhere in chains” [15]. Since these words were written (in 1755), they have
haunted generations of social scientists. In nearly all modern societies, we live
with systemic income inequality. Why?
One idea (dating back at least to John Locke [16]) is that income inequalities
stem from differences in productivity. Those who earn more income, the theory
contends, do so because they are more productive. In the 19th century, Francis
Galton proposed that these productivity differences are genetically inherited [17].
Modern human capital theory, in contrast, argues that productivity differences are
acquired through training [18–21]. Regardless of the source of ability, ‘produc-
tivist’ theories argue that income differences stem from differences in productivity.
A problem with this approach is that it is inconsistent with the facts of per-
sonal income distribution. In most societies, the distribution of income is highly
skewed, with a few individuals earning hundreds (sometimes thousands) of times
more than the average [22–28]. Yet when workers’ productivity is measured inde-
pendently of income, such extreme differences are absent [29,30]. If individuals’
productivity is relatively equally distributed, how can it explain the extremes of
income inequality? Furthermore, why does the distribution of income change with
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time? Does growing inequality mean that top earners are becoming more produc-
tive? Some researchers think so [31,32]. Other social scientists (myself included)
are skeptical.
The primary alternative to the ‘productivist’ approach is the idea that income
differences stem from inequalities in our social relations [33–50]. Individuals with
power, the thinking goes, tend to use it to accumulate resources. Given human-
ity’s evolutionary heritage, I find this social theory of income more plausible than
the ‘productivist’ approach. Virtually all social mammals form dominance hierar-
chies [51–56], within which higher social status allows greater access to resources,
particularly sexual mates [57–62]. Unsurprisingly, humans seem to exhibit similar
behavior [63–67].
If income inequality does stem from asymmetries in our social relations, then
the main task of inequality research should be to understand and model these
relations. With that in mind, my research seeks to understand how income relates
to rank within employment hierarchies — the chain of command inside firms and
governments.
The relation between hierarchical rank and income was first modeled by Her-
bert Simon in 1957 [68]. Simon sought to explain a surprising fact: CEO pay grows
with firm size [69]. This pay trend, Simon showed, could result from the hierarchi-
cal organization within firms. If individual income grows with hierarchical rank,
then the pay of the top-ranked employee would be proportional to the firm’s size.
A few years later, H.F. Lydall [70] demonstrated that the same model of hierarchy
could explain a ubiquitous feature of income — the power-law distribution of top
incomes [22–28].
Despite its promise, this hierarchy model of income distribution has received
little attention. One reason is that the model clashes with the dominant view (in
economics) that income stems from productivity [71,72]. As Simon put it, “only an
improbable coincidence would bring about equality between salaries determined
by [hierarchical rank] . . . and salaries determined by the marginal productivity
mechanism” [68].
Another challenge is that data on the structure of firm hierarchies is scarce. In
the last few decades, however, researchers have begun to quantify this hierarchical
structure and its relation to individuals’ income [73–88]. Although this data is still
limited, when used in tandem with a model, it is sufficient to start exploring how
firm hierarchies affect the distribution (and redistribution) of income.
Methods
My PhD thesis — entitled Economics from the Top Down: Does Hierarchy Unify Eco-
nomic Theory? — examined how seemingly disparate phenomena such as energy
consumption and income inequality can be tied to hierarchical organization [14].
As part of this research, I developed a large-scale numerical model of how hierar-
chical rank relates to income [89]. The first of its kind (to my knowledge), this
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model extrapolates the available case studies of firm hierarchy to simulate the hier-
archical structure of an entire society. The model consists of a population of firms,
each of which is hierarchically organized. Inside each firm, individual income is a
(partial) function of hierarchical rank.
I have so far used this model to study the income effects of hierarchy at static
points in time. The model suggests that hierarchy may play a key role in shap-
ing the power-law distribution of top incomes [11]. The model also suggests that
hierarchical rank (within firms) may be the strongest determinant of personal in-
come [12]. More recently, I have found that hierarchical rank strongly relates to
the class-based (i.e. capitalist-vs-labor) composition of income [13].
A key next step is to study how hierarchy within firms relates to income redis-
tribution. Over the last 4 decades, income inequality in Canada and the United
States has grown steadily, with the steepest gains going to top earners [5,90]. As
part of this income redistribution, we know that CEO pay has increased dramati-
cally [91–93]. But other than for top-ranked executives, we understand little about
how pay practices within firm hierarchies have changed. A key challenge is that
evidence relating income to hierarchical rank remains scarce.
A feasible way to solve this problem is to use my numerical model of hierarchy
to draw inferences from the available empirical data. My first step will be to model
the path-breaking data recently released by Song et al. [94]. The first study of its
kind, Song et al. used Social Security data to study how the growth of US income
inequality relates to the pay structure between and within firms. They find that
the growth of top incomes can be attributed mostly to growing inequality within
firms. Importantly, their data is resolved down to individual employees — a key
piece of information that, in combination with my numerical model, can be used
to infer the effect that hierarchy has on the redistribution of income.
I hypothesize that over the last 40 years, US and Canadian firms have system-
ically redistributed income from the bottom to the top of their hierarchies. To
test this hypothesis, I will first ‘tune’ my hierarchy model to reproduce macro-level
trends in inequality (i.e. the growth of the Gini index and top 1% income share).
This ‘tuning’ consists of constraining a single parameter — the rate at which indi-
vidual income increases with hierarchical rank.
I will then use the model to hindcast trends (provided by Song et al.) in
individual-level pay within firms. This modelling effort represents the first attempt
to mathematically connect macro-level trends in inequality to remuneration trends
within firm hierarchies. If successful, it will create a new tool for studying inequal-
ity.
After first working with US data, I will attempt to generalize the method to
study the hierarchical redistribution of income in Canada. The Canadian Workplace
and Employee Survey details income by occupation. Using methods developed by
Wright [50], I will use occupation as a proxy for hierarchical rank within firms.
I will then use my numerical model to test if/how income has been redistributed
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within the hierarchies of Canadian firms.
Finally, if my postdoctoral research is extended for a second year, I will explore
how different policies affect the pay structure within firm hierarchies. Evidence
suggests that government oversight tends to reduce CEO pay [95, 96]. We know
little, however, about how such policy affects income redistribution within firms. I
hope to shed light on this issue.
Research Alignment
My research builds on and extends the pioneering work of my proposed supervi-
sor, Jonathan Nitzan, and his collaborator Shimshon Bichler. Together they have
developed path-breaking techniques for studying the power underpinnings of cap-
italism [42,97–104]. To date, most of this work has been done at the macro level,
using national statistics. My research on hierarchy provides a new dimension to
Nitzan and Bichler’s study of power. It opens a much-needed link between the anal-
ysis of power and inequality at the societal level, and the fine-scale, hierarchical
structure of this power within firms.
More broadly, York University is an ideal place to pursue this postdoctoral re-
search. I will make ample use of York’s subscriptions to statistical databases, in-
cluding Compustat, Execucomp, and Global Financial Data. And I look forward to
using York’s Open Access Fund to publish my postdoctoral research in open-access
journals. While at York, I hope also to foster a collaboration with Kean Birch and his
postdoctoral colleague Troy Cochrane, who are studying the concept of rentiership
in modern capitalism (SSHRC Insight Grant “From entrepreneurship to rentiership:
The changing dynamics of innovation in technoscientific capitalism”) [105].
Finally, my research on the link between hierarchy and inequality aligns with
York’s priority for ‘Living Well Together’. It also fits synergistically with the univer-
sity’s sustainable-development goals for ‘no poverty’ and ‘peace, justice, and strong
institutions’.
Research Significance
Although hierarchical organization is ubiquitous, we know little about how it re-
lates to income inequality. If, as I hypothesize, hierarchy is a major driver of in-
equality, then it is imperative that we understand the mechanisms at work. My
postdoctoral research represents the first attempt to rigorously connect macro-level
inequality to the fine-scale, hierarchical structure of firms. My hope is that this
research will open a new window for studying how inequality relates to remuner-
ation policies within firms. And ultimately, my goal is to use this understanding to
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